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Abstract
In this paper we extend the theory of precautionary saving to the case
in which uncertainty is multidimensional and we develop a matrix-measure
of multivariate prudence. Furthermore, we characterize comparative pru-
dence, decreasing and increasing prudence, the e¤ect of uncertainty on the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, and the Drèze-Modigliani
substitution e¤ect in this multivariate setting. We also characterize the
concept of multivariate downside risk aversion as a multivariate preference
for harm disaggregation. We show that our denition is equivalent to a pos-
itive precautionary saving motive. We propose an alternative measure of
the intensity of downside risk aversion and show that this measure is use-
ful in understanding several economic problems that involve multivariate
preferences.
1. Introduction
It has been known since Leland (1968) and Sandmo (1970) that a positive third
derivative of a von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is equivalent to a pre-
cautionary saving motive; that is, an increase in saving in response to the pres-
ence of uncertainty surrounding future income. Kimball (1990b) gave the name
prudence to the sensitivity of optimal saving to risk and proposed the index of
prudence,  v
000
(x)
v00 (x) , as a measure of this sensitivity. This measure is isomorphic to
Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971)s index of risk aversion,  v
00
(x)
v0 (x) , which measures
how much a given person dislikes risk. Just as the Arrow-Pratt index of risk aver-
sion implies that a more risk averse individual will require a higher risk premium
to remain indi¤erent in the presence of a fair risk, Kimballs index implies that a
more prudent person will require a larger precautionary saving premium to remain
indi¤erent in the presence of a fair risk (i.e. requires a larger increase in income
to save the same amount as in the absence of the risk).
Despite the tremendous usefulness of these measures in many contexts, one of
their drawbacks is that they can only be applied to situations in which utility is
a function of one variable (e.g. income). Recognizing the limitations that such
approach entails, a number of authors have extended the Arrow-Pratt theory of
risk aversion to the case in which utility depends on many attributes and the risk
is multi-dimensional [e.g. Stiglitz (1969), Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974), Paroush
(1975), Duncan (1977), Karni (1979)]. Karni (1979), in particular, proposed a
matrix-measure of risk aversion and studied the conditions under which a mul-
tivariate utility function is more risk averse than another. To the best of our
knowledge, there does not exist in the literature a measure that captures the sen-
sitivity of saving to a multidimensional risk. The rst objective of this paper is
to present such a measure of multivariate prudence and to study its properties.
Just as Kimball (1990b) established the isomorphism between prudence and
risk aversion in the case of a univariate utility function, we provide a mapping
of Karnis (1979) results on multivariate risk aversion to the case of multivari-
ate prudence. Specically, we derive a matrix-measure of multivariate prudence
and we relate it to the properties of the precautionary saving premium for both
small and large multidimensional risks. We establish, in particular, that given
a multidimensional risk 1) the precautionary saving premium is positive if, and
only if, our multivariate matrix-measure is positive semi-denite and 2) given two
multivariate utility functions, the precautionary saving premium is larger for that
utility for which our multivariate measure is larger (in the sense that the di¤er-
ence is positive semi-denite). The measure that we propose also allows us to
characterize increasing and decreasing prudence, the e¤ect of uncertainty on the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth, and the Drèze-Modigliani (1972)
substitution e¤ect in a multivariate setting. In this way, our work both extends
and complements not only the results of Kimball (1990 a,b) but also more recent
work [Courbage and Rey (2007), Eeckhoudt et al. (2007), Menegatti (2009), No-
cetti and Smith (2011 a,b), Denuit et al. (2011)] that establishes conditions for
precautionary saving to occur in the context of bi-variate utility functions.
A concept that is closely related to Kimballs notion of prudence is that of
downside risk aversion [Menezes et al. (1980), Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006)].
An individual is said to be downside risk averse if he prefers to locate an addi-
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tional risk in states of nature in which wealth is high rather than in states of
nature in which wealth is low. It is by now well known that, in an expected
utility univariate framework, downside risk aversion is equivalent to a positive
third derivative of the utility function, so it is also equivalent to a positive precau-
tionary saving motive. We propose an analogous characterization of a preference
for harm disaggregation for the case in which the risk is multidimensional. In
particular, we dene the concept of multivariate downside risk aversion (MDRA)
as a preference over lotteries in which the multidimensional risk is present when
the level of the attributes is high rather than when the level of the attributes is
low. We show that, in an expected utility framework, our denition is equivalent
to a positive precautionary saving motive. That is, an individual that displays
MDRA (or equivalently, multivariate prudence) endogenously selects to mitigate
the pain caused by the multidimensional risk by transferring current resources to
the future.1
Despite the equivalency of downside risk aversion and a positive precautionary
saving motive many authors have convincingly proposed to measure the intensity
of downside risk aversion with a di¤erent function than Kimballs (1990) measure
of prudence. Crainich and Eeckhoudt (2008), for example, suggested to measure
the intensity of downside risk aversion with the function v
000
(x)
v0 (x) [see also Modica and
Scarsini (2005), Jindapon and Neilson (2007), and Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010)].
Following these lines, we propose an alternative matrix measure that captures the
intensity of MDRA.We show that this measure is useful for evaluating a number
of economic problems, including the problem of social discounting when social
preferences are multidimensional and the problem of saving in the presence of
multidimensional rate of return risk.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we begin by pre-
senting the model of precautionary saving with multiple sources of risk and we
provide a number of interpretations for the problem. Then, we characterize mul-
tivariate prudence and dene the precautionary premium (Section 2.2), we derive
the matrix measure of multivariate prudence from the local approximation of the
precautionary premium (Section 2.3), and we show that this measure is appro-
priate for comparing precautionary saving attitudes among consumers (Section
2.4). Next, we dene the notion of increasing and decreasing prudence and we
1In this way, our characterization also complements the work of Eeckhoudt et al. (2007),
who linked a precautionary saving motive with a preference for harm disaggregation (which
they called cross prudence) in the context of a bivariate utility function and a single source of
risk.
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show its connection with the response of the marginal propensity to consume to
the presence of a multidimensional risk (Section 2.5), we present a multivariate
version of the Drèze-Modigliani substitution e¤ect (Section 2.6), and we present a
few specic examples of our results (Section 2.7). In Section 3 we begin by den-
ing MDRA and by showing that precautionary saving with multiple sources of
risk can be interpreted as endogenous disaggregation of harms. Then, we derive
a measure of the intensity of MDRA (Section 3.2) and present the abovemen-
tioned applications (Section 3.3). Section 4 concludes while Section 5 presents the
lengthier proofs of our results.
2. Precautionary Saving with Multi-dimensional Risks
2.1. Setup and motivation
As is standard in the univariate theory of precautionary saving we consider a
model with 2 dates2. As opposed to the standard analysis, we assume that the
consumer derives utility from n + 1 attributes, (x0; x1;:::; xn), one of them, x0,
being the income. Many interpretations for the other variables are possible. They
include, but are not limited to, the following:
 A vector of market prices. In this case the period utility function can be
interpreted as the indirect utility given the optimal allocation across the
commodities. This is the interpretation given by Karni (1979) in the context
of risk aversion3.
 Similarly, in a model where consumption and leisure enter the utility func-
tion and labor supply is endogenous, indirect utility will be a function of
income (wages, non-labor income, and savings) and the relative price of
leisure (wages)4.
2See, for example, Leland (1968), Sandmo (1970), Drèze and Modigliani (1972), Kimball
(1990), Eeckhoud and Schlesinger (2008), Kimball and Weil (2009). See Carroll and Kimball
(2008) for a recent review of the theoretical and empirical literature on (univariate) precautionary
saving.
3Nocetti and Smith (2011a) develop an innite horizon model of precautionary saving with
commodity price uncertainty. They study the particular case of Cobb-Douglas utility.
4Within this framework, Nocetti and Smith (2011b) establish conditions for precautionary
saving to occur under the assumption of homothetic preferences over consumption and leisure.
Also within this framework, Floden (2006) evaluates the case of small labor income risks.
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 Non-traded commodities, such as the individuals health status, environ-
mental quality, and public goods 5.
 Characteristics of other individuals that a¤ect the consumers welfare. For
example, the consumer may derive utility from the income, health, or edu-
cation of other members of the family and or of society6.
 Own characteristics in the view of others, i.e. social recognition, in which
case the attributes may represent the opinion of others7.
 Own characteristics relative to the characteristics of others. For example, the
attributes may represent absolute or relative di¤erences of the consumers
income with respect to the income of her/his neighbors or with respect to
the average income in society8.
In the rst period our consumer saves an amount s of his income. For gen-
erality, we will not restrict the return on saving to a¤ect only future income.
Instead, we consider the case in which the rate of return on saving for attribute i
(i = 0; 1; :::; n) is i. We will denote by  the vector  = (0; 1; :::; n). For exam-
ple, the consumer may spend current resources to improve his future health, his
relative status in society, and or other individualsopinions about him (e.g. these
two latter aspects capture Veblens (1899) notion of conspicuous consumption).
This setup also permits to model the fact that reducing current consumption
might have a positive impact on future environmental quality. Furthermore, in
the case of public goods, this can capture private contributions to di¤erent public
5This is the interpretation of Courbage and Rey (2007), Menegatti (2009), and Denuit et
al. (2011), who provide conditions for precautionary saving to occur in a bi-variate framework.
Eeckhoudt et al. (2007) provide an interpretation to these conditions within the context of
simple bi-variate lotteries.
6The fact that an individuals welfare may depend on characteristics of other individuals
has a long tradition. Bentham (1789 ch.5), for example, described the pleasure of benevolence
or social a¤ectionas the pleasures resulting from the view of any pleasures supposed to be
possessed by the beings who may be the objects of benevolence.Becker (1974) adopts these
ideas to develop a theory of social interactions.
7Bentham (1789), for example, described the pleasure of a good nameas the pleasures that
accompany the persuasion of a mans being in the acquisition or the possession of the good-will
of the world about him.
8This is the idea of keeping up with the Joneses,studied formally in the context of saving
by Duesenberry (1949) and more recently by Abel (1990) and Gali (1994) in the context of asset
pricing.
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goods. Finally, this may capture transfers, bequests, and charitable contributions
to other individuals whose welfare a¤ects the consumers own welfare (see, e.g.,
Becker (1974)).
The consumer is endowed with increasing (with respect to each attribute) and
concave utility functions u and v that respectively measure the contribution of date
0 and date 1 consumption plans X0 = (x00; x01; :::; x0n) and X1 = (x10; x11; :::; x1n)
to the total utility. We assume that u satises the Inada condition with respect to
its rst variable, that is to say limx00! 1
@u
@x0
(X0) =1 and limx00!1 @u@x0 (X0) = 0
where (x01; :::; x0n) are kept xed.
For each i such that i 6= 0; we also assume that v satises a uniform Inada
condition with respect to xi; that is to say limx1i! 1
@v
@xi
(X1) = 1 where the
convergence is uniform with respect to X1; i that corresponds to the vector X1
deprived of its ith coordinate and limx1i!1
@v
@xi
(X1) = 0 where the convergence is
uniform with respect to X1; i on [k;1) for some k: When v is interpreted as an
indirect utility function where x10 is a wealth variable and where (x11; :::; x1n) are
price variables, it is natural to assume that i = 0; i = 1; :::; n; and the Inada
condition is then only on @v
@x0
:
In the next, we will denote by  the vector (1; 0; :::; 0):
2.2. Multivariate prudence and the equivalent precautionary premium
Under certainty, the consumption/saving problem is
argmax
s
h(s) (2.1)
with
h (s) = u (X0   s) + v (X1 + s) :
We have
h0 (s) =   @u
@x0
(X0   s) +
nX
i=0
i
@v
@xi
(X1 + s)
and, by Inada condition on u we have lims!1  @u@x0 (X0   s) =  1 and
lims! 1  @u@x0 (X0   s) = 0: For i such that i 6= 0 and by the uniform Inada
condition on v; we have lims!1 @v@xi (X1 + s) = 0 and lims! 1
@v
@xi
(X1 + s) =
1: We have then lims! 1 h0(s) =1 and lims!1 h0(s) =  1: There exists then
s such that h0 (s) = 0 and since h is concave, s solves the consumption/saving
problem (2.1). It is easy to verify that the optimal solution s is increasing in x00;
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that is to say, the optimal saving level is increasing in the level of income at date
0. In the next, we assume that the optimal solution is decreasing in x10; that is
to say, the optimal saving level decreases with the date 1 income, which seems to
be a natural assumption. This is equivalent to imposing that
   
@
@x0
Pn
i=0 i
@v
@xi
(X1 + s
)
 @2u
@x20
(X0   s) 
Pn
i;j=0 ij
@2v
@x2i
(X1 + s)
< 0:
Since u and v are concave, the denominator is positive and our condition can be
rewritten as follows
@
@x0
nX
i=0
i
@v
@xi
(X1 + s
) < 0; for all X0; X1 2 Rn+1: (2.2)
This last condition is immediately satised if we assume that
@w
@x0
(X1) < 0; for all X1 2 Rn+1 (2.3)
where w (X1) =
Pn
i=0 i
@v
@xi
(X1) : Conversely, let us assume that (2.2) is satised
and let us consider a given X1: By Inada conditions, there exists X0 such that
@u
@x0
(X0) =
P
i
@v
@xi
(X1) : By construction, the optimal saving level associated to
(X0; X1) is given by s = 0. By (2.2), we then have @w@x0 (X1) < 0: Condition (2.2)
is then equivalent to (2.3). In the next, we let wi  @w@xi and wij  @w@xi@xj ; by (2.3)
we have w0 < 0:
Let us now consider the case where there is uncertainty at date 1. Throughout
the paper, uncertainty will be described as follows. We assume that the date 1
consumption vector X1 might be a¤ected by a noise e= (e0; e1; :::; en) such that
E [ei] = 0; i = 0; :::; n; and with a variance-covariance matrix V e  [ij] with
ij = cov (ei; ej) : We denote by eX1 = (ex10; ex11; :::; ex1n) the vector of date 1 noisy
consumption eX1 = X1 + e= (x10 + e0; :::; x1n + en) :
The consumption/saving problem becomes
argmax
s
H(s) (2.4)
with
H (s) = u (X0   s) + E
h
v
 eX1 + si ;
The solution is denoted by bs and characterized by H 0 (bs) = 0:
Our objective is to compare bs with s: In the spirit of Kimball (1990b) we
propose the following denition
7
Denition 1. An individual is multivariate prudent if the multidimensional riske generates precautionary saving, i.e., bs  s.
Since u and v are concave, the functionH 0 is decreasing and the optimal savingbs is greater than s if and only if H 0 (s)  0: We have
H 0 (s) =   @u
@x0
(X0   s) + E
h
w
 eX1 + si ;
and since @u
@x0
(X0   s) = w (X1 + s) ;
H 0 (s) =  w (X1 + s) + E
h
w
 eX1 + si
and H 0 (s)  0 if and only if
E
h
w
 eX1 + si  w (X1 + s) :
Since we want this inequality to hold for any value of X1; and any additional riske and since X0 is arbitrary, we want E hw  eXi  w (X) for all random variableeX: By Equation (2.3), the function w being decreasing in its rst variable, we
introduce the equivalent precautionary premium 	(X; e; w) dened by
	(X; e; w) = inf n : E hw  eXi  w (X    )o : (2.5)
Since lim	!1w (X    ) = 1; the equivalent precautionary premium is well
dened and lies in R [ f 1g : When 	(X; e; w) is nite, we have E hw  eXi =
w (X  	(X; e; w)) and 	(X; e; w) then corresponds to the certain reduction in
income at date 1 that has the same upward impact on the optimal saving as the
introduction of the additional risk e.
2.3. Local approximation of the equivalent precautionary premium
From now on we only deal with date 1 utility functions and with date 1 allocations.
For simplicity of notations, we will denote by X = (x0; x1; :::; xn) a date 1 alloca-
tion instead of X1 = (x10; x11; :::; x1n) : We will further assume that 	(X; e; w) is
nite (in the next we sometimes just denote it by 	). By Taylor expansions of
the functions on both sides of (2:5), we have
w (X  	) = w (X) 	w0 (X) +O
 
	2

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and
E
h
w
 eXi = w (X) + E " nX
i=0
wi (X) ei#+ E "1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
wij (X) eiej#+ o (trV e)
= w (X) +
1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
wij (X)ij + o (trV
e) :
Setting these expressions equal to one another, as required by (2:5) ; we obtain a
local approximation of 	
 	w0 (X)  1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
wij (X)ij
hence
	   1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
wij (X)
w0 (X)
ij:
Letting Pw denote the matrix Pw 
h
 wij
w0
i
; we have
	(X; e; w)  1
2
tr [V ePw (X)] : (2.6)
Pw is our matrix-measure of local multivariate prudence. The diagonal ele-
ments of Pw,  wjj
w0
; capture the precautionary premium per unit of variance when
each risk is taken in isolation. For example, if i = 0 for i = 1; 2; ::; n the rst ele-
ment of Pw is Kimballs measure of prudence,  w00
w0
=  v000
v00
. Similarly, each of the
other diagonal elements of Pw can be interpreted as measures of cross-prudence
(Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger, 2007). The o¤-diagonal elements,  wij
w0
, can be inter-
preted as the excess precautionary saving premium per unit of covariance. They
capture the distaste for positive dependence between two attributes, which the
consumer compensates with extra saving.
The next proposition points out an important (global) property of Pw relative
to 	:
Proposition 1. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. The function w is convex in X:
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2. The precautionary premium is nonnegative, 	(X; e; w)  0; 8X;8e:
3. The matrix Pw (X) is positive semi-denite for all (X) :
Proof (1), (3) : The function w is convex if and only if the matrix H  [wij] is
positive semi-denite. Since Pw =   1
w0
H and   1
w0
> 0; we have that w is convex
if and only if the matrix Pw is positive semi-denite.
(1) , (2) : The function w is convex if and only if E
h
w
 eXi  w (X) ; 8X;8e
or equivalently if and only if 	(X; e; w)  0; 8X;8e:
The property that the precautionary premium is positive if, and only if, our
measure of multivariate prudence is positive is an important one. However, pos-
sibly more important is establishing if our measure can be used for comparing
optimal decisions of individuals with di¤erent preferences. This is the topic of the
next section.
2.4. Comparative multivariate prudence in the small and in the large
In the classical article "Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large", Pratt (1964)
established the close relationship between the intensity of risk aversion and the size
of the risk premium, for both small and large unidimensional risks. In particular,
given two individuals, say A and B, with a degree of risk aversion aA and aB
respectively, A will require a larger risk premium than B to remain indi¤erent
in the presence of a small or large risk if, and only if, aA > aB. In a similar
fashion, Kimball (1990b) established that, in the presence of a unidimensional
risk, a person will require a larger precautionary saving premium than another
if, and only if, he or she is more prudent. Karni (1979) extended Pratts result
to the case of multidimensional risks. Our objective now is to extend Kimballs
result. For this purpose, we start with the following denition.
Denition 2. Agent A, with utility function vA; is said more prudent than Agent
B, with utility function vB; if	(X; e; wA)  	(X; e; wB), 8X;8e; where wA (X) =Pn
i=0 i
@vA
@xi
(X) and wB (X) =
Pn
i=0 i
@vB
@xi
(X) :
For small risks, the following proposition characterizes the fact that the pre-
cautionary premium 	(X; e; wA) is higher than 	(X; e; wB) in terms of PwA (X)
and PwB (X) :
Proposition 2. In the case of small risks e; we have 	(X; e; wA)  	(X; e; wB)
if and only if the matrix [PwA   PwB ] (X) is positive semi-denite.
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Proof Suppose rst that the matrix [PwA   PwB ] (X) is positive semi-denite. In
the case of small risks, we have, according to (2:6) ; 	(X; e; wA) 	(X; e; wB) 
1
2
tr [V e (PwA   PwB) (X)]  0:
Suppose now that 	(X; e; wA)  	(X; e; wB) : We then have
1
2
tr [V (PwA   PwB) (X)]  0
for all positive semi-denite symmetric matrix V: Consider for a given vector
U; the matrix V  UU t; then U t (PwA   PwB)U = tr [U t (PwA   PwB)U ] =
tr [V (PwA   PwB)]  0; hence [PwA   PwB ] (X) is positive semi-denite.
Consider now the case of general risks. Since w is continuous and monotone in
x0, we dene the (x1; :::; xn)-inversew 1 (; x1;:::; xn) of w as follows: w (x0; x1; :::; xn) =
y , w 1 (y; x1;:::; xn) = x0: We obtain the following global result, extending the
result of Proposition 2 and relating the fact that one agent is more prudent than
another to the matrices PwA and PwB .
Proposition 3. The following three conditions are equivalent:
1. Agent A is more prudent than agent B:
2. The function ' (y; x1; :::; xn)  wA

w 1B (y; x1; :::; xn) ; x1; :::; xn

is convex in
(y; x1; :::; xn) :
3. The matrix R  [PwA   PwB ] (X) is positive semi-denite 8X:
Proof See Appendix.
We conclude that the intensity of the precautionary saving motive is unam-
biguously captured by the derived measure of multivariate prudence, for both
small and large multidimensional risks.
At this point, a remark has to be made. Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974) pro-
posed to restrict comparative multivariate risk aversion to the case in which the
ordinal preferences of two individuals are identical. Within this context, person
A is said to be more risk averse than person B if the (multivariate) utility of the
former is a concave transformation of the latter. Karni (1979) showed, however,
that the restriction of identical ordinal preference is not necessary as long as the
comparison is based upon a particular choice of the risk premium. Yet, if ordinal
preferences happen to be identical his matrix measure of risk aversion coincides
with the denition of Kihlstrom and Mirman (1974).
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Similarly, our analysis of comparative prudence does not restrict ordinal pref-
erences to be the same across individuals. As in the case of Karnis measure or risk
aversion, our measure does depend on the particular choice of the precautionary
premium. For example, although less intuitive, it would be possible to establish
the precautionary premium as the certain reduction in, say, health status that has
the same e¤ect on saving as the presence of the multidimensional risk. Contrary
to the case of risk aversion, a transformation of the utility function of the form
V (X) = g(v(X)), with, say, g
00
< 0 and g
000
> 0 does not imply in general that the
precautionary premium is larger under V than under v.9 Therefore, Kihlstrom
and Mirmans (1974) approach seems to be less valid for comparing higher order
risk attitudes like prudence.
2.5. Decreasing, constant, and increasing prudence in the jth attribute
Pratt (1964) established the intuitive fact that decreasing absolute risk aversion
implies that the risk premium is decreasing in wealth. Kimball (1990b) mapped
this result to the case of precautionary saving, establishing that decreasing ab-
solute prudence, as measured by the univariate function that he proposed, implies
that the precautionary saving premium is decreasing in wealth. To extend these
results to our multidimensional setting we need to specify what decreasing or
increasing prudence mean, which is done in the following proposition.
Using our previous results on comparative multivariate prudence we obtain
the following result
Proposition 4. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. The precautionary premium is a decreasing (resp. constant, increasing)
function in attribute j, i.e. @	(X;e;w)
@xj
< 0 (resp. @	(X;e;w)
@xj
= 0; @	(X;e;w)
@xj
> 0).
2. The matrix   @
@xj
Pw(X) is positive-denite (resp. null, negative-denite).
Proof The precautionary premium is a decreasing function of xj if and only if we
have 	(X; e; w)  	(X + d; e; w) for all d 2 Dj with
Dj = f(d0;    ; dn) : di = 0; i 6= j; and dj > 0g. Let us introduce vd the utility
function dened by vd(x) = v(x+ d) and let us dene wd by wd (x0; x1; :::; xn) =Pn
i=0 i
@vd
@xi
(x0; x1; :::; xn) : We clearly have wd(x) = w(x + d) and we check that
	(X + d; e; w) = 	(X; e; wd): We have then the following characterization. The
9This is also true in the univariate case. See e.g. Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (1994)
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precautionary premium is a decreasing function of xj if and only if we have
	(X; e; w)  	(X; e; wd) for all d 2 Dj. From Proposition 3, this is equivalent
to the statement that Pw(X)   Pwd(X) is positive semi-denite for all d 2 Dj.
Remark that Pwd(X) = Pw(X + d) and that Pw(X)   Pw(X + d) is positive
semi-denite for all d 2 Dj if and only if   @@xjPw(X) is positive semi-denite.
We retrieve then the fact that the precautionary saving premium is decreasing
(with respect to attribute j) if and only if our matrix measure of multivariate
prudence is decreasing (with respect to attribute j) in the sense that its derivative
(with respect to attribute j) is negative-denite.
Kimball (1990 a,b) makes the link between an increasing/decreasing precau-
tionary premium and a decrease/increase of the marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth in the presence of income risk.10 Let us explore how these properties
pertain in our multidimensional setting. We focus on the specic case i = 0; for
i = 1; :::; n:
The consumption function is dened by11
c(X; ~e) = argmaxu(c; y1; :::; yn) + E [v(~x0 + 0(y0   c); ~x1; :::; ~xn)]
where (y0; y1; :::; yn) is kept xed. The marginal propensity to consume out of
wealth is given by @c
@x0
and we want to compare @c
@x0
(X; ~e) with @c
@x0
(X; 0); that is to
say, we want to analyze the impact of the multidimensional risk ~e on the marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth. In the next, the inverse of c (more precisely,
the inverse of the function x0 ! c(X; ~e)) is denoted by g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; ~e0; : : : ; ~en):
By denition, it satises
g(c(X; ~e);x1; : : : ; xn; ~e0; : : : ; ~en) = x0:
For a given function w and a given eX; we also dene the compensating pre-
cautionary premium 	(X; e; w) by
w(x0; : : : ; xn) = E [w(~x0 +	
(X; e; w); ~x1; : : : ; ~xn)] :
10As Kimball (1990 a,b) shows, understanding the e¤ect of income risk on the slope of the
consumption function is of some importance in many economic settings (e.g. in terms of taxation
and asset prices). Carroll and Kimball (1996) extend Kimballs analysis by evaluating the
curvature of the consumption function in the presence of income risk, i.e. the concavity of the
consumption function. Carroll (2009) evaluates the response of consumption to permanent and
transitory shocks.
11Notice that we are referring to consumption of the rst attribute simply as consumption.
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The compensating precautionary premium is the additional amount of income
that induces the consumer to save the same amount in the presence of the multidi-
mensional risk ~e as in the absence of it. The following proposition establishes the
link between the decrease /increase in income (rst attribute) of the equivalent
and compensating precautionary premia and the e¤ect of the multidimensional
risk on the marginal propensity to consume.
Proposition 5. The following conditions are equivalent
1. The equivalent precautionary premium 	(X; e; w) is decreasing (resp. in-
creasing) with respect to x0:
2. The compensating precautionary premium 	(X; e; w) is decreasing (resp.
increasing) with respect to x0:
3. The marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is higher (resp. lower)
in the presence of the multidimensional risk ~e:
Proof See Appendix.
Linking Proposition 5 with Proposition 4 we obtain that a necessary and su¢ -
cient condition for the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth to be higher
in the presence of the multidimensional risk ~e is that the matrix measure of multi-
variate prudence is decreasing in wealth, in the sense that   @
@x0
Pw(X) is positive-
denite. Importantly, this condition implies that the decrease of the usual measure
of prudence,  v000
v00
; is generally not su¢ cient to establish whether the marginal
propensity to consume is higher or lower in the presence of a risk that is mul-
tidimensional. Instead, a necessary and su¢ cient condition requires information
about preferences towards all the attributes that enter the utility function.
2.6. The Drèze-Modigliani substitution e¤ect revisited
Drèze and Modigliani (1972) and later Kimball (1990b) showed that decreasing
absolute risk aversion implies that the precautionary saving motive is stronger
than risk aversion, in the sense that the precautionary saving premium is larger
than the risk premium. Drèze and Modigliani (1972) called the incentive to save
beyond what one would expect from the decrease in utility caused by uncertainty,
the substitution e¤ect. In the next, we rst show that this result pertains when
the absolute risk aversion is assumed to be decreasing in wealth (i.e. in x0) and
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when current saving can only be transformed into higher future income, so i = 0
for i = 1; 2; ::; n.
As Karni (1979) does, we dene the risk premium, (X; e; v), as the certain
reduction of income (rst attribute) that has the same e¤ect on utility as the
introduction of a multidimensional risk e:
E[v( eX)] = v(x0   (X; e; v); x1; :::; xn): (2.7)
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to x0 we obtain
E[v0( eX)] = (1  @(X; e; v)
@x0
)v0(x0   (X; e; v); x1; :::; xn): (2.8)
Therefore, the risk premium is decreasing in x0 if and only if we have
E[v0( eX)] > v0(x0   (X; e; v); x1; :::; xn): (2.9)
By denition, this inequality becomes an equality when replacing the risk pre-
mium (X; e; v) by the equivalent precautionary premium 	(X; e; v0). Given the
concavity of v in x0, this has the following corollary.
Proposition 6. When i = 0; i = 1; :::; n; the following conditions are equivalent
1. The risk premium, as dened in Eq.(2.7), is decreasing with respect to x0:
2. The precautionary premium, as dened in Eq.(2.2) with i = 0 for i =
1; 2; ::; n, is larger than the risk premium.
3. The matrix J  P   A; with P  [ v0ij
v00
](X) and A  [ vij
v0
](X), is positive
semi-denite.
Proof The equivalence of (1) and (2) follows from the discussion above. To show
the equivalence of (3) and (1) notice that the matrix P = [ v0ij
v00
] can be written
as P = A + [ @
@x0
A] v0
v00
. Therefore, [P   A] = [ @
@x0
A] v0
v00
. Given v00 < 0, [P   A] is
positive denite if, and only if, [  @
@x0
A] is positive denite. But, according to Karni
(1979), this is true if and only if the risk premium is decreasing in x0:
Of course, if the risk premium is an increasing (resp. constant) function of
income, then the precautionary premium is smaller than (resp. equal to) the risk
premium. In this way, the important Drèze-Modigliani substitution e¤ect, which
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says that the precautionary saving motive is at least as strong as risk aversion
(given decreasing risk aversion) extends naturally to the multivariate case.
We now consider a more general case. We do not assume anymore that i = 0
for i 6= 0: For a given eX; we may measure the impact of a shift in the direction of
(0; 1; :::; n) by introducing the function
 dened by(X; e; v; s) = ( eX+s).
We will say that the risk premium is decreasing in the direction of  if s !
( eX + s) is decreasing or, equivalently, if @
@s
(X; e; v; s) < 0. This concept
corresponds to the concept of endogenously decreasing risk aversion as in Drèze
and Modigliani (1972) and characterizes the situations where the risk aversion
decreases with the optimal level of saving (that is endogenously determined).
We have
E[v( eX + s)] = v(x0 + 0s  (X; e; v; s); x1 + 1s; :::; xn + ns): (2.10)
Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to s we obtain at s = 0;
E[w( eX)] = w(x0   (X; e; v; 0); x1; :::; xn)
 @
(X; e; v; 0)
@s
v0(x0   (X; e; v; 0); x1; :::; xn)
= w(x0   (X; e; v); x1; :::; xn)
 @
(X; e; v; 0)
@s
v0(x0   (X; e; v); x1; :::; xn): (2.11)
The risk premium is decreasing in the direction of  if and only if we have
E[w( eX)] > w(x0   (X; e; v); x1; :::; xn):
By denition, this inequality becomes an equality when replacing (X; e; v) by
the equivalent precautionary premium 	(X; e; w). Given the concavity of v in x0,
this has the following corollary
Proposition 7. For general ; the following conditions are equivalent
1. The risk premium is decreasing in the direction of :
2. The precautionary premium is larger than the risk premium.
3. The matrix J  P v   Av; with P v  [ v0ij
v00
](X) and Av  [ vij
v0
](X), is
positive denite.
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Proof The equivalence of (1) and (2) follows from the discussion above. To show
the equivalence of (3) and (1) notice that the matrix P v = [ v0ij
v00
] can be written as
P v = Av+[ @
@s
Av;(0)] v0
w0
where Av;(s)  A(X+s). Note that Av; = Av;s where
v;s(X)  v(X+s): Therefore, [P v Av] = [ @
@s
Av;(0)] v0
w0
. Given w0 < 0, [P v Av]
is positive denite if, and only if, [ @
@s
A;v(0)] is positive denite or equivalently if
and only if Av
;s   Av is negative denite for all s > 0: Following Karni (1979)
this means that v;s is less risk averse than v or equivalently that (X; e; v;s) <
(X; e; v): It su¢ ces to remark that (X; e; v;s) = ((X + s) ; e; v) to see that
the condition (X; e; v;s) < (X; e; v) for all s > 0 is equivalent to the decrease
of (X; e; v) in the direction of .
2.7. Examples
To illustrate some of the results obtained so far we will consider two specic
examples. In the rst example we introduce relative price variability in an other-
wise standard model of precautionary saving. In the second example we consider
a simple model, in the spirit of Duesenberry (1949) and Gali (1994), where con-
sumers derive satisfaction from their own income/consumption and also from their
relative position in society.
2.7.1. Income and relative price uncertainty
Imagine a world with two tradable goods. Suppose that in each of two dates the
consumer selects how much to purchase of each good and in the rst period the
consumer also selects how much to save s out of his or her total income x. Let
yi and zi, i = 0; 1; be the amount consumed of the goods at date i; and let qi be
the relative price of good z at date i: Then, the budget constraint for date 0 is
y0+q0z0 = x0 s and the corresponding constraint for date 1 is y1+q1z1 = x1+s:
We assume that there is uncertainty over the date 1 income and the date 1 relative
price. In particular, we assume ex1 = x0+ex and eq1 = q0+ep; where ex and eq are
mean-zero random variables with a variance-covariance matrix V e  [ij] with
ij = cov (ex; eq) : We also assume that the date 1 allocation is done after the
realization of the random shocks. Finally, we assume that the period utility has
a power/Cobb-Douglas form: u (yi; zi) =
(yi z

i )
1 
1  ; with +  = 1:
12
12The case of labor income uncertainty with endogenous labor supply is a sub-case of this
example in which q = x is the wage rate, z is leisure demand, and y consumption (See Floden,
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To evaluate the e¤ect of the multidimensional risk on saving behavior we can
proceed in two steps:
1) Choose yi and zi to maximize utility at each date, the level s of saving being
given. This yields the lifetime indirect utility function
H (s) = K
h
q0 (x0   s)
i1 
+ E
h
q1 (x1 + s)
i1 
;
where K is a constant.
2) Select savings to maximize the indirect utility function. The rst order
condition for this problem is
q
(1 )
0 (x0   s)  = Eq(1 )1 (x1 + s)  :
Clearly, this is an example of our more general model. We readily retrieve that
the local compensating precautionary premium equals 	 = 1
2
tr [V eP ] ; where the
matrix measure of multivariate prudence P is given by
P =

(1 + )x 10  (1  ) q 10
 (1  ) q 10  (1  ) [1 +  (1  )]  1x0q 20

:
The rst element of P; (1 + )x 10 ; is the measure of prudence that would arise
if income were the only source of risk. Introducing relative price uncertainty in
an otherwise standard model of precautionary saving has a number of important
implications. First, an increase in risk aversion, in the sense that the parameter
 is higher, does not in general imply a stronger precautionary saving motive (i.e.
P A   P B ; with A > B is not positive semi-denite).13 Second, a positive
third derivative of the utility function with respect to income is not su¢ cient for
a positive precautionary saving motive. Instead, a su¢ cient condition for P to be
positive semi-denite for all x and q; and as a result for multivariate prudence to
occur, is   1: Third, the risk premium is decreasing in the level of income and
the precautionary premium is larger than the risk premium if   1+

: Fourth, the
precautionary premium is decreasing in income, and so the marginal propensity
to consume is higher in the presence of the multidimensional risk, if 1    1+

:
2006, and Nocetti and Smith, 2011).
13This is consistent with Floden (2006) and Nocetti and Smith (2011), who show that an
increase in risk aversion has an ambiguous e¤ect on the strength of precautionary saving in a
model with wage uncertainty, endogenous labor supply, and power/Cobb-Douglas preferences. It
is simple to show that if the income and the relative price are uncorrelated a su¢ cient condition
for an increase in risk aversion to increase the precautionary saving premium is   1+ :
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In particular, if  < 1 the precautionary premium will be positive, but it may
be lower than the risk premium and the marginal propensity to consume may also
be lower. If 1 <  < 1+

the marginal propensity to consume will be higher in the
presence of the risk, but the precautionary premium may be negative and lower
than the risk premium. Finally, if  > 1+

the precautionary premium will be
higher than the risk premium, but it may be negative and the multidimensional
risk may reduce the marginal propensity to consume. This contrasts sharply
with the standard univariate model in which, given isoelastic preferences, the
precautionary premium is positive, it increases with risk aversion, it is larger than
the risk premium, and is decreasing in income (so it implies a higher propensity
to consume in the presence of income risk).
2.7.2. Keeping up with the Joneses
Let c0 = x0   s and c1 = x1 + s denote rst and second period consumption
and yi the average level of consumption in society at date i. We assume that
each consumers level of consumption is small relative to that of society, so the
selection of a di¤erent level of saving for a given consumer does not a¤ect yi:
Suppose that ex1 = x0+ex and ey1 = y0+ey, where ex and ey are mean-zero random
variables with a variance-covariance matrix V e  [ij] with ij = cov (ex; ey), and
that the consumers lifetime preferences are given by H (s) = u (c0; c0   y0) +
Eu (ec1;ec1   ey1) ; with u (ci; ci   yi) =  e ci (ci yi) (+ ) 1 :
The rst order condition associated with optimal saving is e c1 (c1 y1) =
Ee c2 (c2 y2): From this we can easily derive the local precautionary premium
	 = 1
2
tr [V eP ] ;where the matrix measure of multivariate prudence Pw is given by
Pw =
"
+   (+ )
 (+ ) 
2
+
#
:
We point out that if ex and ey are jointly normally distributed the approxi-
mation is exact and, as a result, the measure of multivariate prudence captures
exactly the strength of the precautionary saving motive (i.e. s = 1
4
tr [V ePw]).
Furthermore, the matrix measure of risk aversion is independent of x and y (i.e.
multivariate risk aversion is constant). Consistent with Proposition 6, this implies
that the risk premium equals the precautionary premium and that the matrix mea-
sures of risk aversion and of prudence are identical (also implied by Proposition 3).
Since the measure of prudence is constant, the marginal propensity to consume is
not a¤ected by the presence of the multidimensional risk (Proposition 5).
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3. Multivariate Downside Risk Aversion
3.1. Precautionary saving as endogenous harm disaggregation
In the context of a single-attribute utility function, precautionary saving has been
linked with a preference towards disaggregation of harms known as downside risk
aversion (Menezes et al 1980). In its presentation by Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger
(2006) downside risk aversion is dened as follows: Given a certain reduction in
wealth  k and a mean-zero random variable e, an individual is downside risk
averse if he prefers the lottery [x   k;x + e] to the lottery [x;x   k + e], where
the outcomes occur with equal probability. Intuitively, an individual is downside
risk averse if he prefers to locate an additional harm in the form of a mean-zero
risk e to states of nature in which wealth is high. Equivalently, he prefers a
reduction in wealth  k in states in which the risk is not present. In other words,
the individual perceives the harms e and  k as mutually aggravating(Kimball,
1993). In an expected utility framework this is equivalent to a positive third
derivative of the utility function, so downside risk aversion is also equivalent to a
positive precautionary saving motive. This should not be too surprising: in the
context of a consumption/saving problem an individual that displays downside
risk aversion (or equivalently, prudence) selects to mitigate the future risk by
transferring resources from the period in which the risk is not present.
To extend this idea to a multidimensional framework we propose the following
denition.
Denition 3. An individual displays Multivariate Downside Risk Aversion (MDRA)
if for all k 2 R+; h
X   k; eXi  hX; eX   ki
where, in each lottery, the outcomes have equal probability.
Again, the intuition of this denition is that a consumer prefers to locate a
harm in the form of a multidimensional risk to states of nature in which the value
of the attributes are relatively high. Equivalently, he would rather have a lower
value of the attributes when the multidimensional risk is not present. In the
expected utility framework, an agent displays MDRA if the following condition
holds
1
2
u (X   k) + 1
2
E
h
u
 eXi > 1
2
u (X) +
1
2
E
h
u
 eX   ki :
The following proposition establishes the condition for preferences to display
MDRA.
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Proposition 1. An Individual displays MDRA if and only if the functionw (X) =Pn
i=0 i
@u
@xi
(X) is convex in X:
Proof MDRA) w convex: we haveE
h
u
 eXi E [u (~x0   0k; ~x1   1k; :::; ~xn   nk)] >
u (X)   u (x  k) : Since k can be made arbitrarily small, we get E
h
w
 eXi >
w (X) : By Jensens inequality, this implies that w is convex.
w convex ) MDRA: By Jensens inequality, we have E
h
w
 eXi > w (X) for all
random variable eX: This implies that for all h > 0;
E
h
w
 eX   hi > w (X   ) ;
hence for all k > 0;Z k
0
E
h
w
 eX   hi dh > Z k
0
w
 eX   h dh:
We then get
E
h
u
 eXi  E hu eX   ki > u (X)  u (X   k) ;
which implies that the individual displays MDRA.
Now recall that convexity of w in X is also necessary and su¢ ciency for mul-
tivariate prudence. Therefore, our denition of MDRA is equivalent to a positive
precautionary saving motive. An individual that displays MDRA (or equivalently,
multivariate prudence) selects to decrease the current level of consumption and
increase the future level of the attributes in order to mitigate the pain caused by
the multidimensional risk.
3.2. The intensity of MDRA
Despite the equivalency of the condition under which an individual displays mul-
tivariate prudence and MDRA their intensity need not be measured in the same
way. The reason is that the intensity of prudence is properly captured by the
magnitude of the compensation that has the same e¤ect on an optimally selected
decision variable as the presence of a risk. Therefore, such compensation equalizes
the expected marginal utility of the decision variable (saving) in the presence and
absence of the risk. Instead, just as in the case of risk aversion, the intensity
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of downside risk aversion is better captured by the compensation that makes a
person indi¤erent in terms of expected utility in the presence and absence of a
risk. This has been emphasized in the univariate framework by a number of au-
thors (e.g. Modica and Scarsini (2005), Jindapon and Neilson (2007), Crainich
and Eeckhoudt (2008), Keenan and Snow (2009), Denuit and Eeckhoudt (2010)).
To evaluate the intensity of MDRA we consider, as Crainich and Eeckhoudt
(2008) do in a univariate framework, the certain amount of income (X; e; u) that
compensates for the di¤erence in expected utility, i.e., such that
1
2
u (X   k) + 1
2
E
h
u
 eXi = 1
2
u (X + ) +
1
2
E
h
u
 eX   ki : (3.1)
Let A (resp. B) denote the left (right) hand side of the equality in Eq. (3.1).
A second order approximation yields
A  u (X   k) + u (X) + 1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
uij (X)ij;
B  u (X + ) + u (X   k) + 1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
uij (X   k)ij;
hence
u (X) +
1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
uij (X)ij  u (X + ) + 1
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
uij (X   k)ij:
Using a rst order approximation for small k and small ; we get u0 (X)  
k
2
Pn
i=0
Pn
j=0wij (X)ij  0; and
(X; e; u)  k
2
nX
i=0
nX
j=0
wij (X)
u0 (X)
ij:
Letting Du denote the matrix Du 
h
wij
u0
i
; we have Du =

 w0
u0

Pw and
(X; e; u)  k
2
tr [V eDu (x0; :::; xn)] : (3.2)
Du is our proposed matrix measure of local MDRA. The following proposition,
which extends Proposition 1, establishes a global property of Du relative to :
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Proposition 2. The following conditions are equivalent.
1. An individual with expected utility and utility function u displays MDRA.
2. The function w is convex in X:
3. The compensating amount is nonnegative, (X; e; u)  0; 8X:
4. The matrix Du is positive semi-denite.
Proof We showed that (1), (2) in Proposition 1
(1), (3) Immediate since u is nondecreasing.
(2) , (4) The function w is convex if and only if the matrix [wij] is positive
semi-denite. Since u0 > 0; this is equivalent to Du positive semi-denite.
Therefore, the compensating amount  is non-negative whenever the precau-
tionary premium is and the matrix measure of MDRA is positive semi-denite
whenever the measure of multivariate prudence is. A natural question that arises
then is: can we compare the MDRA attitude of two agents as we did with the
measure of multivariate prudence? To answer this question we begin with the
following denition.
Denition 4. Agent A, with utility function uA; is said more multivariate down-
side risk averse than Agent B,with utility function uB; if  (X; e; uA)   (X; e; uB),
8 eX:
We obtain the following local result,
Proposition 3. In the case of small risks,  (X; e; uA)   (X; e; uB) if and only
if the matrix [DuA  DuB ] (x0; x1; :::; xn) is positive semi-denite.
Proof The proof follows the same lines as the proof of Proposition 2, using the
fact that A   B  k2 tr [V e (DuA  DuB) (X)] :
Unfortunately, we have not been able to establish a global condition linking
 (X; e; uA) and  (X; e; uB) with the matrix [DuA  DuB ] (X) for all risks. This,
however, should not be very surprising given the di¢ culty in nding global con-
ditions even in the univariate case (e.g. Keenan and Snow 2009).
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3.3. Two applications
In this section we rst present a simple model of social discounting which permits
to establish a closer connection between the proposed measures of MDRA and
of multivariate prudence. Then, we study a complementary problem to that of
precautionary saving presented above; namely, the problem of optimal saving
when the rates of return are uncertain. We show that whether such uncertainty
generates extra saving depends on the intensity of MDRA relative to the intensity
of multivariate risk aversion.
3.3.1. Social discounting with multiple goods
Suppose that there are two dates and that the welfare of the representative con-
sumer is characterized by a discounted intertemporal expected utility function
H(X0; eX1) = u (X0)+E[e v  eX1]; where  captures the pure rate of time pref-
erence.14 Following Gollier (2010), one can dene n social discount rates, one for
each good. We will focus on good 0, which, as before, represents the income.
To dene the social discount rate imagine a marginal project that decreases cur-
rent income by a sure (small) amount " and increases income at date 1 by "er.
Implementing this project would increase social welfare if the net trade-o¤ is pos-
itive. This rule can be written as r  r^ =  + ln(Ev0
 eX1 =u0 (X0)); where r^
is the minimum threshold that the project must exceed to be socially e¢ cient.
This threshold corresponds to the discount rate at which each project should be
discounted in order to evaluate its social e¢ ciency. It is called social discount
rate (for good 0). For expositional clarity we will focus on the case v = u and
X1 = X0 = X.
We can now ask two related questions. First, what is the additional amount of
date 1 income that would make the social discount rate equal to that in an economy
without uncertainty (i.e. such that r^ = )? That is, given 0 = 1 and i = 0 for
i = 1; 2; ::; n; what is the additional amount  such that Eu0
 eX +  = u0 (X) :
Clearly, such additional amount equals the compensating precautionary premium
dened in Section 3, i.e.  = 	(X; e; u0). As we have seen above, for small risks
we have 	(X; e; u0)  12tr [V eP u0 (X)] : More directly we can ask: what is the
14Our analysis is closely related to that of Gollier (2010), who evaluated the problem of social
discounting in a framework where the representative consumer has a utility function dened over
two attributes, income/consumption and environmental quality, which evolve stochastically over
time.
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reduction in the social discount rate, sayr^; that arises due to the existence of the
multidimensional risk? For small risks the answer is r^   u00
u0
1
2
tr [V eP u0 (X)] =
1
2
tr [V eDu (X)] = (X; e; u):
In other words, in order to remain indi¤erent in terms of the multidimen-
sional risk, the representative consumer requires an additional amount of income
	(X; e; u0) or an additional rate of return (X; e; u)15. The matrix measures P u0
and Du capture, respectively, the magnitude of such additional compensations.
More generally, let us now consider general is and let us consider a marginal
project that decreases current income by a sure small amount " and increases
future consumption by "er: The minimum threshold that the rate of return r
must exceed for the project to be socially e¢ cient is then given by r^ =  +
ln(Ew
 eX1 =u0 (X0)): The additional amount  of date 1 income that would
make the social discount rate equal to that in an economy without uncertainty (i.e.
where eX1 is replaced byX1) is then such that Ew  eX1 +  = w (X1) and  again
corresponds to the compensating precautionary premium, i.e.  = 	(X; e; w):
3.3.2. Saving with risky multi-dimensional rate of return
In our analysis of Section 2, we considered a deterministic rate of return on income
and on the other attributes. It is likely, however, that consumers face uncertainty
surrounding the rate of return (e.g. the quality of health care may be uncertain).
In the context of a single source of risk on the rate of return, this problem has been
analyzed by Sandmo (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), and more recently
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2008). In this context, rate of return risk induces
extra saving if the index of prudence  v
000
(x+y)x
v00 (x+y) is larger than 2 where y is the
future labor income16. Equivalently, the condition can be written as d  2a;
where d  v
000
(x+y)x
v0 (x+y) is an index of downside risk aversion and a   
v
00
(x+y)x
v0 (x+y) is an
index of risk aversion. Our objective is to generalize this analysis to the case of
multidimensional uncertainty over the rate of return.
Let us then analyze the following problem where the agent determines an
15Alternatively, the social discount rate in a society with a pure rate of time preference equal
to ^ =  +  and facing the multidimensional risk is the same (at least for small risks) as that
in a society with a pure rate of time preference  and no risk.
16When future labor income is zero we can set y = 0 and the index corresponds to Kimballs
measure of relative prudence.
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optimal saving level s in the presence of an uncertain return rate ~;
argmax
s
H(s): (3.3)
with
H (s) = u (X0   s) + E [v (X1 + s~)] :
The solution is denoted by bs and characterized by H 0 (bs) = 0:
Our objective is to compare bs with s > 0; the amount of savings under
certainty (which we assume to be positive). Such comparison is given in the
following proposition, which also relates the condition for extra saving in the
presence of multidimensional rate of return risk to the matrix measures of MDRA
and of risk aversion.
Proposition 4. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. bs  s
2. The function W () =
Pn
i=0 i
@v
@xi
(X1 + s) is convex in :
3. The matrix Z = sDv   2A is positive denite, where Dv 
h
wij
v0
i
is the
matrix measure of downside risk aversion and A 
h
 vij
v0
i
is Karnis matrix
measure of risk aversion.
Proof We have u (X0   bs) = E [v (X1 + bs~)] and u (X0   s) = E [v (X1 + s~)] :
Since H 0 (s) is decreasing, the condition bs  s is equivalent to H 0 (s)  0 or to
E [w (X1 + s
~)]  E [w (X1 + s)] : Since we want this condition to be satised
for all ~ and all X0; this condition is then equivalent to the convexity of W with
respect to : The second order conditions of convexity give 3.
In other words, uncertainty over the multidimensional rate of return generates
extra saving if the strength of downside risk aversion, as measured by the matrix-
measure Dv, is su¢ ciently large relative to the strength of risk aversion, measured
by the matrix measure A; in the sense that the di¤erence sDv   2A is positive
denite. In the appendix we show that this additional saving can also be motivated
as a more basic preference towards harm disaggregation in lotteries where the
harms enter multiplicatively.
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4. Conclusion
The theory of precautionary saving and the measurement of the strength of the
precautionary saving motive have been topics of extensive research. In a review
of the literature Carroll and Kimball (2008) conclude that "The qualitative and
quantitative aspects of the theory of precautionary behavior are now well estab-
lished." Although this is certainly the case in the context of a single attribute
utility function and a single source of risk much less is known about precaution-
ary behavior in the presence of a multidimensional risk. The objective of this
paper has been to start lling this gap in the literature. We derived a matrix
measure of multivariate prudence and we showed that, in the presence of a mul-
tidimensional risk, this measure is useful for comparing precautionary behavior
among individuals and for comparing the strength of precautionary saving rela-
tive to the strength of risk aversion (i.e. the Drèze-Modigliani (1972) substitution
e¤ect). Furthermore, this measure also allowed us to characterize the concepts of
increasing and decreasing prudence and the e¤ect of uncertainty on the marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth in a multivariate setting.
Extending the work of Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006) and Eeckhoudt et al
(2007), we also showed that precautionary saving behavior in the presence of a
multidimensional risk is closely related with a preference towards lotteries in which
a multidimensional risk is present when the level of the attributes is low rather
than when the level of the attributes is high. We proposed an alternative measure
that captures the strength of such preference and showed that this alternative
measure is useful for evaluating a number of economic problems.
Two interesting and related topics for future research are 1) the analysis of
higher order preferences towards multidimensional risks and the strength of such
preferences and 2) the evaluation of behavior towards multidimensional risks in
the presence of other background multidimensional risks.
5. Appendix
5.1. Proof of Proposition 3
(1), (2) : By denition of 	(X; e; w) and w 1; we have
x0  	(X; e; w) = w 1 E hw  eXi ; x1; :::; xn ;
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hence	(X; e; w) = x0 w 1 E hw  eXi ; x1; :::; xn : The condition	(X; e; wA) 
	(X; e; wB) is then equivalent to
w 1A

E
h
wA
 eXi ; x1; :::; xn  w 1B E hwB  eXi ; x1; :::; xn : (5.1)
By composing both sides of Equation (5:1) by the function wA (; x1; :::; xn) ; which
is nonincreasing, we have
'

E
h
wB
 eXi ; x1; :::; xn  E hwA  eXi : (5.2)
We have wA
 eX = 'wB  eX ; ex1; :::; exn and Equation (5:2) is equivalent to
'

E
h
wB
 eXi ; x1; :::; xn  E h'wB  eX ; ex1; :::; exni : (5.3)
The validity of Equation (5:3) for all eX is equivalent, by Jensens inequality, to
the convexity of the function ':
(2) , (3) : We know that (2) is equivalent to   'iji;j=0;:::;n semi-denite
positive. Letting   (resp. ) denote wA (resp. wB), we have ' (y; x1; :::; xn) 
 

() 1 (y; x1; :::; xn) ; x1; :::; xn

and Rij =
ij
0
   ij
 0
. By direct di¤erentiation,
we get '00 =
@
@y

 0( 1(y;x);x)
0( 1(y;x);x)

=   0
(0)
2
h
00
0
   00
 0
i
=   0
(0)
2R00; hence '00 > 0
if and only if R00 > 0: For i  1; subtracting 'i0='00 times the rst row of 
from the ith row, and then for j  1; subtracting '0j='00 times the rst column
of  from the jth column, we get the matrix M =

'00 0
0 'ij   'i0'0j'00

: The
principal minors of M are the same as those of : By direct di¤erentiation, we
get that
'ij =  0

 Rij   ij
20
R00 +
i
0
Rj0 +
j
0
R0i

;
'i0 =  0

i
20
R00   1
0
Ri0

; 'j0 =  0

j
20
R00   1
0
Rj0

;
and M =   0
 
R00
(0)
2 0
0 Rij   Ri0R0jR00
!
: Since (  0) > 0; it follows that all the
principal minors of M have the same sign as those of the same order of R: Hence
 is positive semi-denite if and only if R is positive semi-denite.
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5.2. Proof of Proposition 5
Let us rst prove (1) , (2) : When X and e are given and when 	(X; e; w) is
decreasing in x0, the function x0 ! x0 	(X; e; w) is increasing and we denote by
f(x0;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en) its inverse. By denition of 	(X; e; w) we have then
w(X) = E [w(f(x0;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en) + e0; ~x1; : : : ; ~xn)]
and we have then that f(x0;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en) = x0+	(X; e; w): Since	(X; e; w)
is decreasing in x0; x0 	(X; e; w) increases faster than x0 and f(x0;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en)
increases in x0 at a slower rate than x0 which gives that 	(X; e; w) decreases in
x0: It is easy to check that a similar argument gives that 	(X; e; w) increases in
x0 when 	(X; e; w) increases in x0:
We prove now that (2), (3). By denition of g; we have
@u
@y0
(c; y1; :::; yn) = E [w(g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en) + e0 + 0(y0   c); ~x1; :::; ~xn)]
(5.4)
and since the left term does not depend on ~e we have
@u
@y0
(c; y1; :::; yn) = w(g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0) + 0(y0   c); x1; :::; xn)
By denition of 	(X; e; w) we have
w(g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0) + 0(y0   c); x1; :::; xn)
= E [w(g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0) + 0(y0   c) + e0 +	(X; e; w); ~x1; :::; ~xn)]
with X = (g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0) + 0(y0   c); x1; :::; xn) :
We have then
E [w(g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en) + e0 + 0(y0   c); ~x1; :::; ~xn)]
= E [w(g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0) + e0 + 0(y0   c) + 	(X; e; w); ~x1; :::; ~xn)]
and since w is decreasing in x0 this gives
g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0) + 	
(X; e; w) = g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en):
Di¤erentiating this equation with respect to c gives
@g
@c
(c;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en) (5.5)
=
@g
@c
(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0)
+(
@g
@c
(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0)  0)
@	
@x0
(X; e; w):
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Di¤erentiating Equation (5:4) with respect to y0 gives
@2u
@y20
(c; y1; :::; yn) =

@g
@c
(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0)  0

E

@w
@x0
( eZ)
with eZ = (g(c;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en) + e0 + 0(y0   c); ~x1; :::; ~xn) :
Since u is concave and w decreasing, we have @g
@c
(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0) 0 > 0.
If 	(X; e; w) is decreasing in x0; Equation (5:5) gives us that
@g
@c
(c;x1; : : : ; xn; e0; : : : ; en) < @g
@c
(c;x1; : : : ; xn; 0; : : : ; 0):
The impact of the multidimensional risk is then towards a decrease of @g
@c
: Since
g is the inverse of the consumption function, this means that the impact of the
multidimensional risk is towards an increase of the marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth. We have the opposite impact when 	(X; e; w) is increasing in x0:
5.3. Uncertain returns and partial MDRA
We can motivate the propensity to save an additional amount in the presence of
multidimensional rate of return risk with a basic preference towards harm disag-
gregation (see e.g. Chiu et al (2010) in the context of a single attribute). Let us
dene MDRA with risky harm as follows:h
X   k~; eXi  hX; eX   k~i ;
where, in each lottery, the outcomes have equal probability. The unique di¤erence
with MDRA lies in the fact that the harm ~ is risky. We may also introduce the
concept of partial MDRA with risky harm by considering the specic situation
where eX is of the form Y + s~ (and hence, X = Y + s), that is to say the
situation where the additional harm is fully correlated to the risk about X: The
partial MDRA with risky harm is then dened by
[Y + s  k~;Y + s~]  [Y + s;Y + (s  k)~] ;
where, in each lottery, the outcomes have equal probability. In the case of expected
utility, we have
1
2
E [u (Y + s  k~)] + 1
2
E [u (Y + s~)] >
1
2
u (Y + s) +
1
2
E [u (Y + (s  k)~)] :
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For small k; this leads to
nX
i=0
E

~i
@u
@xi
(Y + s)

<
nX
i=0
E

~i
@u
@xi
(Y + s~)

or
nX
i=0
i
@u
@xi
(Y + s) <
nX
i=0
E

~i
@u
@xi
(Y + s~)

which is equivalent to the convexity of the function W () =
Pn
i=0 i
@u
@xi
(Y + s)
in ; which is the same condition that we presented in section 3.3.2 for extra saving
in the presence of multidimensional rate of return risk.
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